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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH S. OLSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MORRIS F. SWAPP, et aL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant commenced an action in the Davis County 
District Court to enjoin Bountiful City from rcmstructing 
a sidewalk along the south side of her property without 
paying compensation therefore. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
There was a trial held in the Davis County District 
Court on October 30, 1971. The Court found issues in 
Case No. 
13741 
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favor of the respondent and signed a Judgment and De-
cree providing that Bountiful City was the owner of the 
property and entitled to construct a sidewalk thetreon 
and forever barred the plaintiff from asserting any title 
or interest thereto. On June 5, 1974, the Court signed 
an Order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings, 
Make New Findings or in the Alternative for a New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the foregoing Judgment 
and Decree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While appellant's statement of facts is correct in sig-
nificant portions, respondent will state the facts as found 
by the Court and supported by the record. 
Appellant's home in which she lives is located on the 
Northwest corner of Third North and Main Street in 
Bountiful, Utah. Her house faces East. Appellant and 
respondents dispute the ownership of a five foot strip 
of property traversing east and west along the south 
side of appellant's property. The respondents are desir-
ous of constructing a sidewalk along this strip of ground 
pursuant to a regularly created improvement district 
and claims the property is included within the boundaries 
of Third North Street. The appellant claims that the 
five foot strip of property belongs to her and thus this 
law suit. 
Third North Street is a 3 rod street and is shown 
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as such in the Bountiful Townsite, Plat "A", Which is 
maintained in the office of the County Recorder of Davis 
County, Utah, as an official record of said recorder and 
kept and maintained in the same manner as other orig-
inal townsite plats (R-42, 51, 52, 75). It is not known 
when the plat was filed, and also whether recording in-
formation was assigned to the plat since none is noted 
on the plat. This plat includes appellant's property which 
is designated as Lot 1, Block 53, Plat A, Bountiful Town-
site Survey in the Deed to her,, dated November 25, 1940 
(Ex. Q). The plat sets out numerous blocks and streets 
including Third North Street. 
The first title owner of the property, now owned by 
the appellants, was William Walton, who received title 
from the Probate Judge in 1872 (Ex. J ) . In describing 
the property reference was made to "Block 53, Plat A, 
in the town of Bountiful". All subsequent conveyances, 
including the conveyance made to appellants, describe 
the property by reference to Block 53, Plat A (Ex. K, L, 
M, N, 0, P, Q, R). It therefore seems evident that the 
plat was of public record very early as it was repeatedly 
referred to in instruments of conveyance from the very 
beginning. 
Appellant's father, James Smedley, acquired the 
property in 1889 (Ex. P) . It was apparently some time 
subsequent to his acquiring ownership that a barbed wire 
fence, and subsequently a hedge, was located along the 
south bondary of the property and encroaching upon the 
disputed 5 foot strip (R-6). 
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Pertinent and material facts with respect to appellant 
and her predecessors in interest and their relationship to 
the property in question, are these: 
a. They have never possessed any portion of 
Third North Street prior to or at the time 
of the entry of the Bountiful Townsite. 
b. They have never had nor do they now have 
any record title to any portion of Third 
North Street and particularly of the prop-
erty in question (Ex. J, K, L, M, N, 0, P, 
Q ,R) . 
c. They have never erected or maintained any 
improvements within the boundaries of Third 
North Street except for the maintenance of 
the hedge along the south boundary of ap-
pellant's property which encroaches on the 
north part of the street (R-6). 
d. They have never paid any property taxes 
covering any portion of Third North Street 
and the property in question, and no taxes 
have ever been assessed covering any portion 
of said street (R-29). 
e. Bountiful City lias never taken any action 
of any kind to abandon or vacate any portion 
of Third North Street and has never taken 
any affirmative action of any kind which 
would lead appellant to believe that the city 
was abandoning., vacating or giving up any 
interest in Third North Street or any part 
thereof. 
f. Third North is an improved street — there 
never were any encroachments along the way 
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and at least was open for passage way as 
early as 1915 (R-31). 
In 1927, a re-survey of the old Plat A, was made. 
The survey is referred to as the Burningham Survey and 
establishes monumentations (R-36). Insofar as it relates 
to Block 53, there is apparently no dispute as to the 
actual location of the boundaries of Third North Street 
as it relates to the South boundary of appellant's prop-
erty. Testimony of appellant's own surveyor and the 
plat prepared by him, completely supported the facts 
asserted by the respondents, that the N/S measurements 
of Block 53, Plat A, as shown by the old Plat A, which 
hangs in the Recorder's Office, the Burningham re-survey 
and appellant's own survey, is exactly 330 feet (Ex. 5, 
R-41). The South boundary of appellant's property is 
described in the chain of title and is indicated by the 
Burningham re-survey and the old Plat A; is therefore 
north of the land in question; clearly excluding that land 
from the property conveyed to appellant's predecessors 
in title. 
The City of Bountiful properly and regularly created 
Bountiful Improvement District No. 9, for the purpose 
of (instructing curbs, gutters and sidewalks along cer-
tain streets in Bountiful. One of the improvements to 
be constructed is a sidewalk which as mentioned earlier 
traverses along the property in question and adjoins ap-
pellant's property on the south. The sidewalk to be con-
structed is entirely within the boundaries of Third North 
Street and entirely south of plaintiff's property. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PROHIBIT-
ING THE APPELLANT IN TESTIFYING 
AS TO MATTERS OF FAMILY HISTORY 
RELATED TO HER BY HER FATHER PER-
TAINING TO BOUNDARIES, CONDITION 
AND USE OF THE PREMISES. 
The appellant alleges, that the Court erred in not 
allowing testimony by her of statements made by her 
father (now deceased), relating to bonudaries and im-
provements on the property (R-5-8). 
Appellant argues that this testimony should have 
been allowed as an exception of the hearsay rule. It is 
true that declarations of persoos since deceased, with 
regards to location of boimdary lines, etc., are usually 
considered competent evidence even though hearsay. To 
be admissible, however, the declaration must be made by 
one who is disinterested at the time of such dedaration. 
It must also be shown that the declarant had peculiar 
knowledge of the facts, which facts form a part of the 
res gestae. In the present case, there was no proper foun-
dation made. 
Even assuming that the statements and evidence 
were otherwise admissible, such error was harmless. Sec-
tion 776, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, provides as 
follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"To warrant reversal, two elements must be 
shown: error, and injury to the party appealing. 
Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or 
merely academic, and not prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the party assigning it, and 
where it, in no way, effects the final outcome of 
the case; it is prejudicial, and ground for re-
versal, only when it affects the final result of 
the case and works adversely to a substantial 
right of the party assigning it." 
Even if there was error, such error was cured by the 
admission of other competent evidence. Exhibit P, which 
shows a conveyance of portions of Block 53, Plat A, to 
appellant's father, James Smedley in 1889, was admitted 
into evidence (R-4). Appellant's surveyor testified as to 
the location of Block 53, and his survey was admitted 
into evidence (R-33, Ex. S). The appellant was able to 
testify to her own knowledge concerning the location 
of the hedge and various photos were introduced as to 
its location (Ex. A, B, C). Other testimony concerning 
improvements on Block 53, were immaterial unless they 
related to the particular disputed strip of property. After 
all the evidence was m, appellant was able to establish 
the location of her south boundary, the location of the 
disputed strip of property and the extent of improve-
ments thereon. Appellant has failed to show any preju-
dicial error. 
POINT II. 
BASED ON THE FACTS IN THE RECORD 
AND THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISS-
ING THE COMPLAINT AND IN ADJUDI-
CATING THAT BOUNTIFUL CITY WAS 
THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF THE DIS-
PUTED PROPERTY. 
Appellant contends that she is entitled to the owner-
ship of the 5 foot strip of property in question. She does 
not contend that she, through her predecessors in inter-
est, acquired title through some instrument of convey-
ance; nor does she contend that she could have acquired 
the strip of land by adverse possession from the city. Such 
a contention would be of little avail to the appellant in 
view of Section 78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1963. 
Appellant asserts that the City of Bountiful is estopped 
from claiming any interest in the portion of the street 
in question because of the non-action of the city in as-
serting title to this portion of the street which led her to 
believe the city claimed no interest in the strip of land 
in question. It is the contention of the respondents that 
the city can not be estopped under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
It is doubtful that under the present statutes that 
a Utah city can ever be estopped in claiming an interest 
in a dedicated street. The earliest case to be decided 
under our present statute involving the question of es-
toppel appears to be the case of Tooele City v. Elkington, 
166 P. 2d 406, 100 Utah 45 (1941). In that case, an alley 
way abutting the Elkington property was dedicated as 
an alley in the original Townsite Plat of Tooele City. 
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The alley was never used as such, however, and was 
always kept fenced within the Elkington property by 
Elkington and his predecessor in interest. In 1938, the 
City Council of Tooele passed a resolution to deed the 
property to Elkington and pursuant to that resolution, 
the Mayor of Tooele executed a Quit Claim Deed con-
veying the property to Elkington. Later, the city of 
Tooele brought suit against Elkington to acquire title 
in the alley in the city. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that under Utah law, the only way the city could vacate 
a dedicated street or alley, was by ordinance and that 
therefore, the deed to Elkington from the city was illegal, 
unauthorized and void. The Supreme Court also held 
that the city was not estopped to claim title to the alley 
because of its acts in deeding the alley to Elkington. It 
noted that the city had been paid little by Elkington 
for the alley and that there had never been a replatting 
of the alley, and that the portion of the alley which 
Elkington claimed had never been assessed for taxes to 
the defendant. The Court stated: 
^Balancing the justices of the cause, we find 
there is no ground for estoppel against the city. 
In so doing, we are mindful of the fact that in-
dividuals dealing with officers should be able to 
rely upon their acts; that officers should act 
within the authority granted; and that officers 
should be held to their acts and covenants like 
individuals. However, the community is inter-
ested in the vacating of streets and the legisla-
ture has provided that they be vacated by ordin-
ance, in order that the community may have 
notice of the acts of the commissions and thereby 
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protect the private property holder and the com-
munity against such actions." 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had the oppor-
tunity to review the Utah Law on this point in the case 
of Provo City v. Denver and Rio Grande Railway Com-
pony, 156 F. 2d 710 (1946). In that case, the railroad 
needed to substantially expand its existing facilities. One 
method contemplated was to construct new facilities out-
side of the City of Provo. The other alternative was to 
enlarge existing facilities in the city but in order to do 
so, it was necessary to obtain the vacation of an existing 
street. The Railroad and the Mayor and Commission-
ers of the city entered into negotiations which resolved 
in an oral agreement that an ordinance would be passed 
closing the street. The railroad relying on this oral agree-
ment barricaded the street and construced its enlarged 
facilities. The agreed upon ordinance was never intro-
duced or passed by the city. Citizens of Provo later pro-
tested the vacation of the street and the city in response 
to such protest, removed the barricade and began work 
to open the street as a public thoroughfare. The rail-
road then instituted proceedings to enjoin the city, its 
Mayor and Commissioners from reopening the street con-
tending that the city was estopped from contending that 
the land in question was a dedicated street. This con-
tention was rejected by the Tenth Circuit and the Rail-
road's case was directed to be dismissed. The Court held 
that under the Utah Statutes* the city of Provo had the 
power to vacate and close the street only by ordinance; 
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that in absence of such ordinance, the adoption of equit-
able estopped could not be invoked against the city. The 
count reviewed all prior Utah cases dealing with the adop-
tion of the estoppel against the city involving city streets. 
It stated that the Utah Statutes provided that the streets 
or parts thereof should be vacated by ordinance. The 
Court stated, 
"These three cases considered in their composite 
effect, seem to make it clear that in Utah, the 
principal of estoppel in pais, is to be applied 
very narrowly to a city in respect of its right to 
re-open a street for use as a public thoroughfare 
and only in cases where the city acted within 
the ambit of its legal authority but in an irregu-
lar way; and that the principal does not have 
controlling application in a case of this kind 
where the Mayor and City Commissioners mere-
ly agree verbally to pass an ordinance closing 
the street but never did again attempt to pass 
it regular or irregular." 
The most recent case on this question is to be that 
of Cox v. Carlisle, Mayor of Manti City, 359 P. 2d 1049, 
11 Utah 2nd 372 (1961). This involved an appeal from 
a judgment which declared Manti City to be the owner 
of a 66 foot strip of land platted as a city street. The 
land in question had been platted as a city street by the 
original townsite plat of the city of Manti. In 1871, the 
plaintiffs predecessor in interest, obtained a Mayor's Deed 
to a lot in Manti which adjoined both sides of the platted 
street. The street, as platted, was not shown to have 
even been used as a street. Irrigation improvements were 
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made on the strip of land in question by the pliaintliff 
commencing prior to 1910. Based upon these facts, the 
Court held that there could be no estoppel against the 
city in claiming title to the street in question. The court 
stated: 
"The proof here commands but one point that 
we need canvass on appeal: is Manti City es-
topped to assert title in the strip platted as a 
street. We believe and hold that this question 
must be answered in the negative under the facts 
adduced. . . . 
Significant are these: 1) Neither plaintiff nor 
others ever paid any taxes on the property since 
or before 1871; 2) No one has challenged the 
ownership lieniated by the recorded plats ' t i l 
here; 3) Manti has claimed no taxes thereon; 
4) The evidence conflicts somewhat as to 
whether the area was used as a roadway at the 
time or for sometime after the deeds, the Town-
site Entry and the establishment of proof by 
claimants in the Probate Court, but there is am-
ple, competent evidence that easily could lead 
the arbiter of facts recently to conclude that the 
strip so had been used; 5) that plaintiff, whose 
burden it was to show occupancy for her or her 
predecessors before and at the time of the town-
site entry, showed none; 6) that the only affir-
mative documentary representation as to occu-
pancy at that time, was a County Surveyor's 
map, which has persisted by recordation to date, 
reflecting the existence of the city street, and 
importing notice to all, including plaintiff; and 
7) that everyone concedes that the record fee 
title thereto, has unbroken continuity to date in 
Manti City. 
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"No evidence except perhaps a legitimate silence 
points to any Manti representation intended to 
induce a reasonable person to claim title to the 
strip upon which he acted to his detriment. Re-
cordation of the plat and its persistence sans 
challenge, inertia on the part of the plaintiff or 
anyone else to pay or offer to pay taxes on the 
area, and the use of the land by the plaintiff 
and predecessors for a long period of time would 
seem to have been more of a benefit, would not 
support the luxury of a claim or irreparable dam-
age on termination of such use, but would sup-
port an inoculation of the city against any claim 
of estoppel." 
From the foregoing cases, it would appear extremely 
doubtful that the city would ever be estopped from title 
to a portion of a dedicated street except in the case where 
the city has attempted to vacate the street by ordinance. 
Actually, Cox v. Carlisle (the Manti case), seems 
clear to be controlling here since, 
1. Neither plaintiff or others ever paid any 
taxes on the property. 
2. No one has challenged the ownership 'till 
here. 
3. Bountiful has claimed no taxes thereon. 
4. The evidence is uncertain as to when the 
area was used as a roadway, but at least, 
as early as 1915, it was used as a pathway 
and the road is presently improved and un-
der use. 
5. That the appellant, whose burden it was to 
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show occupancy for her or her predecessors 
before and at the time of the Townsite En-
try, showed none except the eoocroachment 
by a fence and hedge. 
6. That everyone concedes that the recorded 
fee title thereto, has never been held by 
the appellant or her predecessors. 
Appellant relies heavily on Hall v. North Ogden 
City, 166 P. 2d 221, rehearing granted and judgment set 
aside, 175 P. 2d 703 (1946). In that case, the plaintiff 
instituted action to enjoin the town of North Ogden from 
opening up as a street, certain tracts of land indicated 
as streets, by the Townsite Plat,, but which had never 
been opened or used as streets and upon which valuable 
improvements have been erected by the plaintiffs. The 
thrust of the Hall case was, where the land was occupied 
prior to the entry of the townsite by the County Probate 
Judge, pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1867, 
the occupant had an equitable interest in such land which 
became vested when the land was entered by the Probate 
Judge in the Land office and which was not divested for 
failure to file a claim as long as the occupant remained 
in possession. The important distinction between the 
facts in the Hall case and those in the case at bar is in 
Hall case, the early settlers possessed the entire street 
area prior to the entry of the plat and subsequent title 
holders continued to use and possess the property in ques-
tion up to the time of trial. 
In the case at; bar, at the time of the entry of the 
plat, the area of Third North was not possessed by any 
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of the adjoining owners, With the exception of the area 
i J dispute, none of Third North has ever been possesed or 
uned h> ,u. adjoining landowner regards to 
;m*a included within Third Nort -w claimed by 
;:anft I In only improvement is the maintenance of 
-*(i£r :!»ojig the south boundary of appellant's prop-
vWncii encroaches on the north part of the street. 
.,is hedge was apparently planted sometime subsequent 
in appellant's father purchasing the property in 1889 
and subsequent to the entry of the plait, Then to, by 
Plant's own admission, Third North was -^ed a*- a 
formal street as early as 1930, •and 'the actual aorth curb 
line of the street comes to within approximately five feet 
of the south boundary of appellant's property. 
While 'the holding of the Hall case was reversed on 
re-hearing, that reversal was based on the fact that the 
street involved had never been dedicated or used as a 
public street. It is significant that the Utah Supreme 
Court has not retreated from the position it took in, the 
first hearing, of the Hall case, Ififi P. 2<\ J2I and that 
is that the city's interest in J dedicated street cannot 
**• \<Y*t bv adversed poN>assioi* ••» i>ioj>pr! 
J "In appellant asserts that Unre was a failure to 
'K-dit-au- the street because apparently, neither the old 
Pk t A, nor the Bummgham re-survey had been re-
corded, in accordance with the current recording pro-
cedure This assertion, if accepted, would mean that not 
only tiu* streets m Bountiful but according to testimony 
given at uml, those at KavsvHIh- and Pamiington as well, 
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are subject to ownership claims by contiguous property 
owners. 
This would be dearly an intolerable situation. The 
better view is, that Plat A, was made of record very 
early since all instruments of conveyance relating to Block 
53, made reference to "Block 53» Plat A". The better view 
is that although the recordation of some of the old plaits 
may not have complied with current recording proced-
ures, there was in essence, substantial compliance which 
should be recognized as suffident in the interest of avoid-
ing confusion and further Mitigations. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respetfully submitted that under the facts and 
the applicable law, the appellant has foiled to show any 
right or title to the property in question on the basis of 
any feasible theory and accordingly, the decision of the 
lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAYNE B. FORBES 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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